Institutions vs. ‘first-nature’ geography: what drives economic growth in Europe's regions? by Ketterer, Tobias D. & Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés
  
Tobias D. Ketterer and Andrés Rodríguez-Pose 
Institutions vs. ‘first-nature’ geography: 
what drives economic growth in Europe's 
regions? 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Ketterer, Tobias D. and Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés (2016) Institutions vs. ‘first-nature’ geography: 
what drives economic growth in Europe's regions? Papers in Regional Science. ISSN 1056-8190 
 
DOI: 10.1111/pirs.12237 
 
© 2016 The Author(s). Papers in Regional Science. © RSAI  
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67544/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: August 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
1 
Institutions vs. ‘First-Nature’ Geography – What Drives 
Economic Growth in Europe’s Regions? 
 
by 
 
Tobias Ketterer§ and Andrés Rodríguez-Poseɤ,
*
 
 
 
§ 
European Commission, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, Rue de la Loi 170, B-1049 
Brussels, Belgium 
 
ɤ 
Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics, Houghton St, 
London WC2A 2AE, UK 
 
*
 Corresponding author: a.rodriguez-pose@lse.ac.uk 
 
 
Acknowlegements 
 
The authors are grateful to Roberta Capello, the editor in charge, and to the anonymous 
referees for their stimulating suggestions to the earlier versions of this paper. The comments 
by participants at seminars in Padua, St Petersburg, Utrecht, and Washington have been also 
greatly appreciated. The financial support of the European Research Council under the 
European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013)/ERC grant agreement 
no 269868 has been essential for this research. 
 
  
2 
Institutions vs. ‘First-Nature’ Geography – What Drives 
Economic Growth in Europe’s Regions? 
 
 
Abstract 
The debate on whether institutions or geography prevail in driving economic growth has been 
rife (e.g. Sachs 2003 vs. Rodrik et al. 2004). Most of the empirical analyses delving into this 
debate have focused on world countries, whose geographical and institutional conditions 
differ widely. Subnational analyses considering groups of countries with, in principle, more 
similar institutional and geographical conditions have been limited and tended to highlight 
that geography is more important than institutions at subnational level. This paper aims to 
address whether this is the case by investigating how differences in institutional and ‘first-
nature’ geographical conditions have affected economic growth in Europe’s regions in the 
period 1995-2009. In the analysis we use a newly developed dataset including regional 
quality of government indicators and geographical charactersitics and employ 2-SLS and IV-
GMM estimation techniques with a number of regional historical variables as instruments. 
Our results indicate that at a regional level in Europe institutions rule. Regional institutional 
conditions – and, particularly, government effectiveness and the fight against corruption – 
play an important role in shaping regional economic growth prospects. This does not imply, 
however, that geography is irrelevant. There is evidence of geographical factors affecting 
regional growth, although their impact is dwarfed by the overriding influence of institutions.  
 
Keywords: Regional economic growth, institutions, geography, quality of government, 
NUTS-2 regions, Europe 
JEL codes: R11, O11, O43 
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1. Introduction 
 
Indicators of economic prosperity vary significantly across countries and regions. The 
wealthiest country in the world, Qatar (98,814 US$ per capita), is 182 times richer than the 
poorest, the Central African Republic (542 US$).
1
 The gap between Europe’s regions is 
considerably smaller, but still substantial. The European Union’s (EU) poorest region, 
Severozapaden in Bulgaria, has a GDP per inhabitant which at 7,200€ (28% of the EU-28 
average) is more than twelve times lower than that of its richest region, Inner London (80,400€ 
or 321 % of the EU-28 average).
2
 With similar examples across the world and within different 
countries the question which arises is what drives these regional differences and what can 
policy makers do to narrow the gap between rich and poor territories?  
Scholars have tried to explain differences in development in many different ways. In 
recent years an important debate has emerged opposing two factors as competitors: local 
institutions vs. geographical conditions. On the one hand, researchers such as Rodrik (2000), 
Acemoglu et al. (2001), Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al. (2002; 2004) posit that 
the roots of differentials in development levels lie in institutional factors. The quality of local 
institutions, which is reflected in a society’s formal and informal rules and norms and in its 
potential to generate desirable economic behaviour, is considered to be a major – if not the 
major – driver of economic growth and dynamism (North 1990; Hall and Jones 1999). In 
particular, a territory’s political and legal setting, including the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, and the presence or absence of service-oriented government structures are 
considered key in determining the government’s credibility in policy formulation, its ability to 
reduce uncertainty, as well as to cut down the monetary costs of economic activity.  
However, not everyone supports the idea that institutions are the main driver of existing 
economic differences. A second strand of literature puts geography at the heart of economic 
development and growth. Geography – understood as ‘first-nature’ geography, i.e. the physical 
and natural geographical conditions that shape every territory – determines the presence of 
natural resource endowments, transport costs, and knowledge and technology diffusion, thus 
shaping a territory’s potential for development. From this perspective, productivity and the 
accumulation of human capital are strongly affected by the geography of places (Diamond 
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1997; Gallup and Sachs 2000; Sachs 2001, 2003; McArthur and Sachs 2001), meaning that 
geography governs the growth potential of any territory.
3
  
Although this dichotomy may be somewhat artificial, institutions and first-nature 
geography have been pitched against one another in a lively and somewhat bitter debate. Even 
more balanced recent contributions indicating that both institutions and geography matter (e.g. 
Bosker and Garretsen 2009; Naudé 2009) cannot escape the dichotomy at the heart of this 
debate.  Both groups of scholars have tried to stand their ground in a number of country-level 
studies about which factor matters most for economic growth – institutions or geography. The 
debate has so far produced evidence to support both camps, without yielding a clear verdict.  
One of the main characteristics of this debate is that empirical analyses have generally 
focused on countries in the world. Similar studies at the regional level have been extremely 
limited – with the notable exception of Gennaioli et al. (2013). The question which remains is 
thus whether in settings where institutional and geographical differences tend to be 
significantly smaller than in a cross-country context covering most parts of the world, such as 
the EU, institutions or geography actually make a difference for economic development. 
In this paper we contribute to the discussion by looking at the competition between 
institutions and geography from a sub-national perspective, taking regions in the EU as our 
object of study.  In order to assess whether it is local institutions or geography which matters 
most for regional development in the EU, we use a novel dataset on quality of government 
measures and geographical data – including a series of historical variables employed as 
instruments. Our analysis focuses on European NUTS-2 regions of the EU-15
4
 and covers the 
time period 1995 to 2009.  
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the main arguments 
behind institutional and geographical factors as shapers of economic growth. Section 3 
describes the empirical methodology and discusses the data, while the results are presented and 
interpreted in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Institutions vs. Geography 
                                                     
3
 Sachs (2003: 3) states that geography may also have influenced institutional choices and concludes that “the 
logic of the geography-institutions linkage is also the logic of a direct geography-productivity linkage”. 
 
4
 We exclude those countries which joined the EU since 2004 because of their different history and significantly 
lower institutional quality and levels of GDP per capita. This allows us to maximise the homogeneity of our 
dataset as well, as a result of better data availability, as to cover a longer time period in the analysis. 
5 
Why do some regions develop faster than others? The quest for the factors behind economic 
development is as old as growth theory. More recently researchers and policymakers have gone 
beyond the traditional interest in infrastructure, human capital, and innovation to focus on two 
distinct types of factors: institutions and geography.  
Institutions can be defined as the ‘rules of the game’ that shape human interaction and 
cooperative activity (North 1990). They include behavioural norms and traditions, as well as 
legal, moral and ethical concepts on which societies are based. As basic regulators of human 
interaction and economic activity, institutions matter for economic development and growth, 
and are crucial in determining “the social atmosphere of a particular locality” (Amin and Thrift 
1995: 104). Stable and reliable institutions are essential factors in providing a sound framework 
for economic activities and reducing transaction costs. Most academic work on the economic 
impact of institutions has been concerned with formal institutions and, in particular, with 
property rights and the rule of law. A combination of a secure system of property rights with a 
transparent and well-functioning legal system is often considered to be the key recipe for 
economic progress (North 1990; Knack and Keefer 1995; Keefer and Shirley 2000; Acemoglu 
et al. 2005). Research has also tended to underline how institutions are embedded in history. 
The design and quality of past institutions has been reported to have a crucial impact on the 
effectiveness of current institutional settings (Tabellini 2010).  La Porta et al. (1999), for 
example, analyse the determinants of government quality in different countries and document 
the relevance of historical factors in explaining the variation in government performance. 
Differences in colonisation have also been found to influence economic development 
(Acemoglu et al. 2001), while the impact of other types of historical variables on current 
economic performance has been reported in numerous analyses (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2003; 
Dollar and Kraay 2003; Satyanath and Subramanian 2004).  Additional empirical support for 
the relevance of institutions has been provided by Hall and Jones (1999), who find that a 
substantial part of the variation of activity across countries is explained by institutions and 
government policies (i.e. the social infrastructure). All this research provides a strong evidence 
for the relevance of institutions, as underlines that, when institutional variables are included in 
growth regressions, they tend to dwarf the impact of almost any other potential growth driver. 
Geographical location already featured in the work of Adam Smith (1776). But in 
recent years the analysis of how factors such as location, access to waterways and other 
geographical features affect economic growth has witnessed a revival. When examining the 
causes of large income differentials across countries, ‘first-nature’ geography is often 
considered as a fundamental, deeply-rooted underlying factor of a territory’s growth potential 
6 
(Warner 2001; Rodrik et al. 2002). The implications of location and local physical conditions 
for transportation costs and the capacity to develop new economic activities are important and 
determine – to a larger or lower extent depending on the physical characteristics of a territory – 
the potential for growth in a given place. 
Numerous physical geography factors have featured prominently in this type of 
research. Distance and access to navigable waters have been frequently highlighted as central 
determinants of economic growth (Gallup et al. 1999). Access to the coast is also a critical 
factor, as coastal regions tend to perform better, once other variables are taken into 
consideration, than countries further away from the sea (Bloom et al. 2003). Research has also 
concentrated on the impact of natural endowments on economic development, attaining mixed 
results. Several studies have reported evidence of a ‘resource curse’ – that is, the negative 
impact of large natural endowments on economic growth (Sachs 1995; Auty 2000; Gylfason 
2001). Climate has also been taken into consideration. Masters and McMillan (2000), for 
instance, find evidence of varying economic performance depending on the temperature zone 
in which a country is located. In African tropical countries, for example, convergence is 
conditional on the achievement of economies of scale, while for those in more temperate zones 
convergence fundamentally depends on policy choices (Masters and McMillan 2000). 
Similarly it has been found that countries situated along the equator (Bloom et al. 2003) or the 
tropics (Sachs and Warner 1997) are more likely to have low levels of development compared 
to countries in more temperate climates. And higher average temperatures are considered to 
significantly reduce economic growth in poor countries (Dell et al. 2012).  
Empirical work on the association between institutions and geography, on the one hand, 
and economic development, on the other, has been, however, mainly conducted at a national 
level. Using countries as units of analysis yields interesting results, but overlooks the important 
fact that both institutional and geographical conditions, while often varying significantly across 
regions, tend to be much more subtle and nuanced within a given country or, for that sake, a set 
of countries which share relatively similar historical trajectories and geographical 
characteristics. Differences in GDP per head – the proxy generally used for development – 
institutional quality, and geography across countries in the world are stark. The gap in voice 
and accountability, government effectiveness, or regulatory quality between those nation-states 
with the highest governance quality (generally Scandinavian countries or Singapore) and those 
at the bottom of the ranking (countries like Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Korea, or 
Turkmenistan) is much greater than anything seen within any individual country or group of 
countries with relative similar the conditions, such as those of the EU (Kaufmann et al. 2010). 
7 
Disparities in the rule of law, which are strong across the world, are much smaller in a national 
or even in a European context, were countries have to fulfil the so-called Copenhagen criteria 
in order to join the EU.
5
 Similarly, international contrasts in geographical conditions – from 
access to the sea, to the ruggedness of the terrain, average temperature and precipitation, or the 
incidence of tropical diseases – are much greater at world level than anything that can be found 
in Europe.  
The strong institutional and geographical differences across countries in the world 
shape our perception of whether it is institutions or physical geography which has a greater 
influence on levels of development. However, national geographical averages may not 
necessarily reflect the specific conditions which affect economic activity in different parts of a 
country. But, how these smaller intra-national or intra-European differences in geography and 
institutions impact economic development is much more poorly understood. The limited 
empirical research focusing on the impact of local and regional institutions and geography on 
sub-national economic growth performance gives partial and contrasting results. On the one 
hand, Tabellini (2010) finds that culture – measured by trust and respect for others – is strongly 
correlated with current levels of regional development in 68 regions in eight EU countries. 
Government structure and its institutional quality have also been associated with the 
effectiveness of public policies, in general, and European cohesion policies, in particular 
(Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger 2005; Ederveen et al. 2006; Bähr 2008; Rodríguez-Pose and 
Garcilazo 2015). On the other, Gennaioli et al. (2013), covering 1,569 regions in 110 countries, 
report that institutions – proxied by the business environment – do not account for differences 
in income per head. By contrast, they find that favourable geographical factors, such as access 
to the sea, lower average temperatures, and better natural endowments lead to higher levels of 
development. They argue that while “some institutions or culture may matter only at the 
national level, […] large income differences within countries call for explanations other than 
culture and institutions” (Gennaioli et al. 2013: 107-108), the reason being that “differences in 
institutions or culture are arguably small within countries and in any event much smaller than 
between countries” (Gennaioli et al. 2014: 265).  
There is therefore a dearth of solid empirical evidence for a causal chain linking local 
and regional institutions and geography to economic development and existing results tend to 
be contradictory. This is a problem as, increasingly, socio-economic literature considers local 
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 The Copenhagen criteria require any country aiming to join the EU to have democratic institutions, safeguards to 
respect human rights, a functioning market economy, and a capability to absorb the whole EU legislation (or 
Acquis Communautaire). These conditions imply that formal institutions should be relatively homogenous across 
the EU.   
8 
and regional institutions and geography as essential drivers for sub-national economic activity, 
as well as important building-blocks for local risk and transaction cost reduction (Jütting 2003; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Storper 2006; Rodríguez-Pose 2013).  
In brief, the existing literature seems to provide both, evidence for the relevance of 
institutions and geography for economic growth at a national level. Contrasting and comparing 
the relative importance of both factors, however, has sparked a fierce debate about which of 
these two forces prevails, with some authors claiming that institutions rule and other that they 
don’t (see for instance Rodrik et al. 2004 and Sachs 2003). While Acemoglu et al. (2001), 
Easterly and Levine (2003), and Rodrik et al. (2004), find that the impact of institutions on 
national income levels dwarfs everything, with limited evidence for the role of geography, 
others, including Gallup et al. (1990), Gallup and Sachs (2001), Sachs and Malaney (2002), 
Sachs (2003), disagree with the supposed primacy of institutions, providing ample evidence of 
a direct effect of geography on economic growth and income.  
There is also limited evidence of whether institutions and/or geography matter at all in 
more homogeneous contexts, such as that of Europe. And when this evidence has emerged, the 
results have been contradictory (Tabellini 2010 vs. Gennaioli et al. 2013). Against this 
controversial backdrop we aim to assess the role of institutions vs. ‘first-nature’ geography on 
development in the sub-national regional context of the first 15 members of the EU, precisely 
those for which geographical and institutional differences are more limited and data availability 
is greater. The next section lays out the conceptual framework which will be brought to the 
data.  
 
3.  Methodology  
 
3.1 Conceptual framework  
 
To justify our empirical approach we take inspiration from Ertur and Koch (2007) and sketch 
out a simple conceptual framework based on an augmented Solow growth model.
6
 In addition 
to allowing for cross-territory technological interdependence, we assume that technological 
progress and technology adoption are affected by institutional parameters reflecting the quality 
and efficiency of governments, investment- and business-oriented soft infrastructure as well as 
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 Ertur and Koch (2007) develop a growth model with Arrow-Romer externalities and spatial externalities in a 
setting with N world countries. 
9 
by the reliability of the judicial environment (Aron 2000). We consider the following Cobb-
Douglas production function for region i (with i=1,…,N) at time t:  
   1)()( iiiii LQKtAtY  
(1) 
where )(tK i denotes the stock of physical capital, )(tLi  the amount of labour supply, 
and )(tQi  the institutional quality parameter. )(tAi  represents the aggregate level of 
technology: 
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(2) 
The level of aggregate technology includes several major factors. First, there is an 
exogenous part, which is assumed to be identical in all regions ( )(t ) and has a constant 
growth rate. Second, the aggregate level of technology rises with the level of capital and 
institutional quality per worker ( )(tki and )(tqi ). Hence, additional capital investments increase 
the level of the capital stock as well as the region’s overall level of technology through 
knowledge spillovers. Similarly, improvements in government quality facilitate spillovers and 
the technological up-grading of all firms in the economy. The assumption that technology 
adoption is influenced by institutional factors is based on the view that technological take-up is 
constrained by ‘social capability’ (David 1998), implying that the local institutional 
environment plays a fundamental role in determining why certain development strategies take 
hold and others do not.
7
 Moreover, we suppose that these knowledge spillovers are not limited 
to a region's borders, but that the knowledge incorporated in capital or institutional quality 
extends beyond the geographical boundaries of any territory. Cross-border effects, however, 
suffer from a decay effect and diminish with distance.
8
 Including cross-border technological 
and institutional interdependence in the production function (1) leads to a per-capita growth 
model of spatial heterogeneity: 
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 The parameters ϕ and η in equation (2) describe the strength of these externalities. 
 
8
 The parameter γ in equation (2) measures the level of spatial externalities, where what is, in theory, an identical 
effect for all regions, de facto depends on an exogenous friction term wij denoting the distance between region i 
and j. 
10 
with y, k, and q denoting the respective production function parameters expressed in per-capita 
terms.
9
  
 
3.2 Specification 
 
In this section we evaluate the effect of savings, population growth, government quality, and 
location (including a set of geographical variables) on income growth. Equation (4) denotes the 
spatially augmented Solow equation, which can be transformed into a standard Solow 
specification by setting the spatial weighs equal to zero and dropping the quality of government 
and geography terms: 
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(4) 
 where the dependent variable denotes regional GDP per capita growth (in PPS); s 
represents savings and hence investment; n denotes exogenous population growth; g is 
technological progress; δ is the constant depreciation rate of capital. εi,t represents the 
idiosyncratic error term.
10
 The analysis is conducted at the NUTS-2 regional level and includes 
up to a maximum of 2,576 observations. Our dataset excludes Eastern Europe given their 
different recent history and the difficulties in collecting historical instrumental variables for 
this region. We hence focus on sub-national territories in the original fifteen members of the 
EU (EU-15).
11
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 We assume, as in Mankiw et al. (1992)  that these variables (i.e. n+g+δ) are constant over time and jointly add 
up to a value of 5%. Annual time fixed effects are also introduced in order to control for time-specific 
characteristics. 
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 For countries without an adequate regional structure (i.e. Luxembourg), country-wide statistics were used. Some 
countries (Denmark and Greece) had to be excluded due to insufficient data availability, as was the case for a 
number of individual regions – Ceuta and Melilla (E), Canary Islands (E), all French overseas departments 
(Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane, Réunion), Açores (P), Madeira (P), North Eastern Scotland (UK), and the 
Highlands and Islands (UK). 
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 Our main explanatory variables of interest are regional quality of government and a raft 
of first-nature geography variables. To assess whether institutions matter we employ a recently 
constructed institutional index measuring government quality at a regional NUTS-2 level 
(Charron et al. 2014). The institutional index – reflecting the overall quality of regional 
government – can be decomposed into its four constituent components: i) fight against 
corruption; ii) rule of law; iii) government effectiveness and bureaucracy; and iv) government 
accountability.
12
 Amongst the ‘first-nature’ geography variables considered, we include terrain 
ruggedness, which we expect to exert a negative impact on local economic activity by 
increasing the costs for transport and trade. Ruggedness is computed as the log of 1 plus the 
difference between the minimum and maximum altitude of a region. Differences in climate 
across Europe’s regions are controlled by the inclusion of January and July mean temperatures. 
A region’s distance to the equator is included to indicate physical location. Several country-
level studies point to a substantial impact of a territory’s latitude when explaining differences 
in output and development (Gallup et al. 1999; Mellinger et al. 2000).
13
 To account for 
potential nonlinearity in the correlation between economic growth and latitude, we introduce 
the squared value of latitude. Other geographical variables include i) a region’s access to the 
sea, which reflects a territory’s advantageous location in terms of ease of accessibility; ii) a 
number of regional soil characteristics;
14
 iii) additional climate and weather characteristics 
(daily temperature ranges, precipitation, and cloudiness). Weather and soil-related attributes 
may influence the distribution of human activity across space and hence shape a region’s 
development potential for economic exchange. Both factors may also shape settlement patterns. 
Better climates and more fertile lands have driven demographic growth and population density 
levels. Finally, the geographic size of a region is taken into account by introducing the 
territory’s surface in square-kilometres.  
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 As the ‘quality of government’ (QoG) index and its individual components are adjusted around zero, with 
positive and negative values reflecting favourable and less favourable institutional environments, respectively, we 
add a value of 10 in order to be able to include them in logarithms. 
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 Some studies, however, stress that distance from the equator, rather than reflecting an area’s geophysical 
attributes, portrays economic, institutional, and other non-geophysical factors (Hall and Jones 1999; Nordhaus and 
Chen 2009). Hall and Jones (1999) for instance argue that a country’s latitude may be used as a measure for a 
territory’s distance to Western Europe, a factor which may have influenced the development and design of market 
institutions.  
 
14
 Among others, we include soil limits to agriculture, soil class, dominant parent material, soil differentiation, 
depth, erosion, water capacity, mineral composition of the soil, and organic content (for greater detail, see Table 
A2 in the Annex). 
12 
3.3 Data 
 
The aim of this section is to highlight some of the most salient characteristics of the dataset. 
Eurostat’s Regio database is the source for the economic and population-related variables. The 
institutional variables stem from a new dataset developed by Charron et al. (2014). These 
authors construct a ‘quality of government’ (QoG) index at the EU national, as well as sub-
national (regional) level, by combining the World Bank’s country-level ‘World Governance 
Indicators’ (WGI) (Kaufmann et al. 2009) with an EU-wide regional survey of 34,000 
Europeans. According to the authors the survey, including 34,000 respondents, “constitutes the 
largest survey ever undertaken to measure quality of government at the sub-national level to 
date” (Charron et al. 2014: 72). It covers a total of 172 NUTS-1 and NUTS-2 regions. On 
average the survey targeted around 200 participants per region
15
 and consisted of 34 quality of 
government-, and demography-related questions, addressing topics such as education, health 
care, and law enforcement – services often provided by local or regional authorities in Europe. 
Those consulted were asked to rate services with respect to their quality, impartiality and the 
presence of corruption. Answers led to the construction four composite indices of government 
quality, reflecting the residents’ perception of i) the prevalent level of corruption; ii) the rule of 
law at the local level; iii) government effectiveness; and iv) the strength of democracy and 
electoral institutions (voice and accountability). The authors also amalgamated all four 
individual components into one composite index for regional quality of government. Each 
indicator was standardized, providing a regional distance to the national score, expressed in 
standard deviations. The regional distance was subsequently standardised at the EU level, using 
the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) time series. For more detailed 
information on the survey, as well as on the construction of the indices see Charron et al. 
(2014). 
The geographical variables in the analysis stem from a range of sources. Soil-related 
regional characteristics, including soil limits to agriculture, soil depth and differentiation were 
obtained from the European Soil Database. Mitchel et al. (2004) is the source for regional 
weather and temperature data. Finally, we use a series of regional historical variables, collected 
by Gilles Duraton, Giordano Mion and Andrés Rodríguez-Pose. The historical dataset was built 
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 However, aware that the “the number of respondents per region was on the smaller side (200)” (Charron et al. 
2014: 7773), the country context of each region was added for robustness to the region’s score, with the aim of 
introducing elements of the local institutional quality which were not captured by the survey. This allowed the 
authors of the survey to compensate for any shortcomings of the presence of outlying regions within any country 
with the addition of “credible and robust” country data (Charron et al. 2014: 73).   
13 
by manually digitalizing and geo-coding historical maps provided by Kishlansky et al. (2003) 
and the online source www.euratlas.com. The set of historical variables, used as instruments 
for our institutional parameters, includes several variables:  
a) Charlemagne, depicting whether a current European region belonged to 
Charlemagne’s empire and/or was a tributary territory to it at the time of the 
emperor’s death; 
b) Rome, capturing a region’s affiliation to the Roman empire at the time of Julius 
Caesar (49 BC), as a proxy for strong exposure to the Roman state, legal and military 
system;  
c) Early Christianization, indicating whether a region was Christianised in 600 AD, 
which aims to account for the proliferation of a certain set of morals, societal norms 
and ideas; and 
d) Number of kingdom changes, a measure of early political stability/instability, 
reflecting the number of times a region changed kingdom between 500AD and 
1000AD. This variable was constructed using different maps including the 
boundaries of European kingdoms in 100 year intervals. Every territory in each of 
the six time periods was ascribed to a kingdom using geo-coding techniques.  
Please see Table A1 in Appendix for the exact definitions of each variable and of their sources. 
Table A2 provides the descriptive statistics. 
 
3.4 Endogeneity issues 
 
A major challenge in economic analysis is establishing causality. While geographical aspects 
may be assumed to be reasonably exogenous, the identification of the direct and indirect 
channels through which ‘first-nature’ geography may affect economic performance are trickier. 
It has been argued that geographical factors have a notable direct effect on economic 
dynamism through their impact on (agricultural) productivity and production systems, 
morbidity and life expectancy, but also through the physical location and the availability of 
natural resources (Diamond 1997; McArthur and Sachs 2001; Sachs 2001; 2003). Indirect 
effects may be present through their sway on the distance from major markets and their 
influence on the development of institutions themselves.
16
 
                                                     
16
 Unequally distributed or ample natural resource endowments may, for example, hamper institutional 
development (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003). 
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Establishing a direct causal link between a region’s institutions and economic 
performance is more difficult, as higher income may also represent a cause rather than a 
consequence of better institutions. In order to address this potential reverse causality concern 
and to demonstrate that institutions are an independent driver of economic activity, we use 
instrumental variable techniques aiming at finding exogenous sources of variation for 
institutional quality. First, all independent variables are introduced with a one-year lag in order 
to minimise potential endogeneity. More importantly, two-stage least square (2SLS) 
estimations and heteroscedasticity-robust system ‘Generalized Method of Moments’ (GMM) 
estimators are used in the analysis. The specific estimator chosen for the IV-GMM regressions 
is the system GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) in its second-step version.  
For the choice of instruments we resort to the set of regional historical variables 
mentioned earlier. Following the new institutionalist view (North 1986; 1990), a region’s 
historical heritage may have significantly shaped the development and design of institutions, 
such as the type of legal system, as well as the role played by formal and informal norms in 
governing societies. This type of historical variables have often been used as instruments for 
institutional quality (e.g. La Porta et al. 1999; 2000; Acemoglu et al. 2001; 2002; Engerman 
and Sokoloff 2000; 2002). 
As indicated in the previous section, our preference for historical instruments goes well 
back in time. Past events and historical shocks are likely to have left a deep trace on territories, 
shaping the character of their institutions until today (Duranton et al. 2009). Hence the choice 
of Charlemagne, Rome, Early Christianization, and Number of kingdom changes. All 
instruments are regionalised. The selection of these historical variables is governed by the fact 
that it is highly likely that early exposure to stable and ‘modern’ governance – be it through the 
Roman or Charlemagne’s Empire –, together with the influence of Christianity, as well as long 
periods of political stability would have determined the formation of institutional systems and 
their successive development across Europe. Likewise, we also argue that centuries of political 
instability caused by different norms and commitments under different kingdoms or tribal rule 
may have also shaped early institutional development and altered legal and institutional 
developments accordingly. 
Given how deeply embedded in time these variables are, they can reasonably be 
considered as exogenous instruments, as they are likely to be sufficiently uncorrelated with 
other potential (and omitted) causes of economic dynamism. In addition, we also include past 
values in the IV regressions, assuming that past institutional features are linked to current ones. 
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4. Results 
 
In this section we present the empirical results for 184 NUTS-2 regions in Europe during the 
period between 1995 and 2009. We first focus on the standard Solow growth model to which 
we successively add the individual institutional components and geographical variables. 
Section 4.1 introduces the results when estimating various empirical specifications with OLS 
and heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, while section 4.2 reports the instrumental 
variable results using 2-SLS regressions. Section 4.3 presents the findings when using an 
Arellano-Bond panel data IV-GMM technique.
17
 Finally, a spatially augmented growth model 
is presented in section 4.4, adding information of neighbouring regions to the standard Solow 
model. 
 
4.1 Pooled OLS 
The results of the standard Solow OLS analysis (Table 1) indicate that our control variables are 
broadly in line with our expectations. First, and following a neoclassical perspective, initial 
GDP per capita levels are negatively associated with economic growth, providing evidence of 
conditional beta convergence and of a catching-up process of poorer regions on a European-
wide scale.
18
 Regional population growth rates also follow the predictions of the neoclassical 
Solow growth framework and display a consistently negative sign in the coefficient which is, 
however, not statistically significant at the usual levels. Productive capital, measured by local 
gross fixed capital formation, is reported to exert a positive effect on local economic 
performance in almost all model specifications. Measuring productive capital is however 
notoriously difficult and this problem may have some influence in the lack of statistical 
significance observed in all but one model specification. 
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 The results including a series of soil characteristics and further weather-related climatic factors are presented in 
Annex Tables 4 to 8. Moreover, a model with region fixed effects is also run in order to control for all remaining 
unobserved sources of spatial heterogeneity. The results are reported in annex Table A8 and, by and large, confirm 
the alternative estimation outcomes. They highlight the existence of a statistically significant positive effect of the 
combined government quality variable, the fight against corruption, and government effectiveness. All time 
constant regressor are dropped when using the FE estimator. Finally, to account for a possible interaction between 
institutions and the geography, we interact the combined quality of government index with a set of geographical 
variables. The results, reported in Table A9 in the Annex, show significant coefficients in most specifications for 
the combination of institutional index and coast or regional ruggedness. This suggests that coastal areas may 
benefit more good institutional settings than land-locked areas. This finding, however needs to be treated with 
caution given the very high values for the VIF tests – which point to important multicollinearity concerns. 
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 Note that when introducing the geographical variables (Table 1, Regressions 9 to 12), the parameter estimates, 
although still negative, are no longer statistically significant at the usual levels. 
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Concerning our independent variables of interest – institutions and ‘first-nature’ 
geography – some interesting findings emerge (Table 1). First, there is a positive and highly 
significant (at the 1% level) association between quality of government and regional economic 
performance (Table 1, Column 4). Our results therefore corroborate past analyses at the 
national (Knack and Keefer 1997; Rodrik et al. 2002; 2004; Keefer and Shirley 2000; Dollar 
and Kraay 2003; Acemoglu et al. 2005) and regional (Tabellini 2010) level which have 
underlined the importance of institutions for economic growth. They, nevertheless, contradict 
recent studies which have stressed that within country institutional differences do not matter for 
economic performance (Gennaioli et al. 2013 and 2014). They also confirm previous country-
level studies highlighting the importance of government quality (La Porta et al. 1999).  
Decomposing the institutional quality index into its individual components allows us to 
assess which government quality factors are more important for economic growth. The results 
of the analysis show that all four components of the quality of government index have a 
positive and significant connection with economic growth. The fight against corruption, the 
rule of law, and government effectiveness and accountability are essential for a good regional 
performance in Europe. These three variables display in all cases positive parameter estimates 
that vary between 0.014 and 0.039 (Table 1, Columns 5-8), underlining the growth-promoting 
role of aspects such as the efficient and non-bureaucratic provision of public goods and 
services, a functioning and independent legal system, as well as low levels of local corruption. 
In Columns 8 to 12 of Table 1 a set of local geographical variables is introduced. The 
introduction happens first without controlling for the institutional environment (Table 1, 
Column 9), followed by the inclusion of the composite government quality index (Column 10), 
and of four individual government quality aspects (Columns 11 and 12). Including the 
geographical variables in the Solow-type growth framework without considering government 
quality factors (Column 9) shows similar results to the specification with the government 
quality index (Column 10): most geographical variables are insignificant. Neither regional 
access to the sea (positive coefficient) nor local terrain ruggedness (negative coefficient), 
which emerge as essential elements for economic activity in most studies of the role of 
geography for economic growth at the national level (e.g. Gallup et al. 1990; Gallup and Sachs 
2001; Sachs and Malaney 2002; Bloom et al. 2003; Sachs 2003), seem to matter for economic 
growth at a regional level in Europe. Other geographical factors are more significant. This is 
the case of the land area of a region – a result which is corroborated when additionally 
including the composite government quality index (Table 1, Column10) – and of a region’s 
distance from the equator (i.e. latitude). The former variable displays a positive coefficient, 
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while the latter is negatively associated with regional economic growth in Europe. The squared 
value of latitude variable is positively connected to growth, once quality of government has 
explicitly been controlled for. These results suggest a non-linear relationship, implying that a 
region’s physical location is at first less favourable the further away it is located from the 
equator. This possibly reflects the catch-up process of some regions in Southern Europe during 
the period of analysis and that, beyond a certain threshold, the association becomes positive 
with increasing latitude. 
Introducing both quality of government components and the geographical variables in 
the analysis (Table 1, Columns 11 and 12) simultaneously points to the fact that institutions 
trump ‘first-nature’ geography as a driver of economic growth at the European regional level. 
In particular, low corruption levels and high government accountability indicators prevail as 
the most important institutional factors, while most of the ‘first-nature’ geography variables are 
not statistical significant. The exceptions are regional latitude and January mean temperatures, 
meaning that a milder winter is the only climate factor to facilitate greater economic activity in 
Europe in recent times.  
Tables A3 and A4 in the Annex report the findings when including an extended set of 
climate and weather-related variables, in absence and presence of regional institutional 
characteristics. The results show a negative effect of January precipitation and July 
evapotranspiration (moisture or humidity) levels and suggest a positive influence of daily 
January temperature ranges and winter moisture-levels. Winter and summer cloudiness are 
found to be statistically not significant. When including government quality in the analysis, the 
results remain by and large unchanged and show a statistically highly significant and positive 
impact of the quality of regional government (Table A4). 
Our final physical geography variables include a large battery of regional soil 
characteristics (Tables A5 and A6). The results suggest a positive connection of less fertile 
soils (soil limits to agriculture), less podzolic and more ferrasolic soils (see soil class). They 
also provide partial evidence for a positive relationship of soil depth and subsoil water capacity 
with regional growth perspectives. A negative effect is reported for the topsoil available water 
capacity. Considering regional institutions confirms these findings and highlights, once again, 
the persistent and highly significant impact of the institutional variables in all model 
specifications (Table A6). 
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Table 1: Standard Solow estimation including institutional parameters. Pooled OLS 
European Union 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Initial GDP per capita -0.006* -0.006* -0.005 -0.007* -0.007* -0.006* -0.006 -0.008** -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Investment (gross fixed capital formation) 
 
-0.0002 0.002 0.003 0.003* 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Population growth 
  
-0.058 -0.031 -0.033 -0.025 -0.048 -0.007 -0.107 -0.144 -0.174 -0.272** 
   
(0.085) (0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) (0.078) (0.100) (0.099) (0.105) (0.116) 
Institutional quality Index (QoG) 
   
0.025*** 
     
0.047*** 
  
    
(0.007) 
     
(0.011) 
  
Fight against corruption 
    
0.029*** 
     
0.046* 0.053** 
     
(0.007) 
     
(0.025) (0.025) 
Rule of law 
     
0.024*** 
    
-0.004 -0.011 
      
(0.007) 
    
(0.024) (0.024) 
Government effectiveness 
      
0.014** 
   
-0.007 -0.008 
       
(0.006) 
   
(0.014) (0.013) 
Government accountability 
       
0.039*** 
  
0.039** 0.040** 
        
(0.010) 
  
(0.016) (0.016) 
Coast 
        
0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001 
         
(0.001) (0.0013) (0.001) (0.001) 
Regional Ruggedness 
        
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
         
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Area 
        
0.000* 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
         
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Latitude 
        
-0.0001 -0.001*** -0.006** -0.008*** 
         
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Latitude squared 
          
0.0001** 0.0001*** 
           
(0.00002) (0.000) 
Mean Temperature - July 
           
-0.001 
            
(0.0004) 
Mean Temperature - January 
           
0.001*** 
            
(0.0004) 
Constant -0.006 -0.011 -0.013 -0.056* -0.056* -0.059* -0.040 -0.076** -0.013 -0.099*** -0.006 -0.013 
 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.038) (0.065) -0.072 
Observations 2576 2515 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 
R-squared 0.591 0.562 0.570 0.570 0.571 0.570 0.570 0.571 0.613 0.618 0.618 0.620 
Mean VIF 1.00 1.00 1.07 1.08 1.11 1.08 1.06 1.11 1.30 1.46 61.53 60.89 
Heterogeneity (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes:  Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent and reported in parentheses below all coefficients. *, **, *** respectively denote the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels. The t-statistics are 
shown in parentheses. Constant and time dummies are not reported. It is worth noting that most mean VIFs are below 6 (apart from regressions (11) and (13) indicating some multicollinearity 
issues). 
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4.2 Two-stage least squares estimations 
Addressing endogeneity concerns by means of the two-stage least square regressions (Table 
2) allows us to jump from the simple associations detected between our institutional variables 
and regional economic performance in the OLS analysis to determining the direction of 
causality and, therefore, impact. As mentioned in the methodological section, we employ an 
instrumental variable technique using lagged values and historical data on past regional 
affiliations to kingdoms, empires and to early Christianization.
19
  
Table A7 in the Annex reports the first-stage regression results. The general validity 
and significance of the instruments, introduced is indicated by the first-stage F-tests of jointly 
insignificant instruments, which are rejected in all first-stage regressions. In addition, the F-
test statistic at the bottom of Table A3 displays values that are far larger than ten.
20
 The 
Anderson-Rubin test results for each specification (Table 2) further reinforce the validity of 
the instruments, as the p-values reject the null hypothesis of joint insignificance at the 1% 
threshold level in all specifications. 
Overall, the 2-SLS results reported in Table 2 support the findings presented in Table 
1. The instrumental variable regressions point to a significant negative impact of initial GDP 
per capita levels in most specifications, with statistically significant coefficients at the 5 or 
10% threshold, and which are, in terms of magnitude, similar to the OLS results. The results 
also indicate a highly persistent and negative impact of regional population growth rates on 
per capita economic performance. Furthermore, the regression results also highlight the 
importance of investments in productive capacity, with parameter estimates that are 
significant at the 1% level.
21 
More importantly, the results of the IV analysis underline the relevance of institutions, 
in general, and quality of government, in particular, for regional economic growth in Europe 
(Table 2). Both the composite government quality index and its individual components 
display positive parameter estimates which are statistically significant at the 1% threshold 
level (Table 2, Columns 4 to 8). These results also hold when controlling for geographical 
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 The first-stage results involving the use of initial values and a selection of historical variables as instruments 
are presented in Table A7. 
 
20
 Table A7 also includes the Angrist-Prischke (AP) under-identification test scores under the null that a 
particular endogenous regressor in question is unidentified. The AP first-stage F-statistic displays favourable 
results, as the test values are relatively large. 
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 The last two model specifications (Columns 11 and 12) represent an exception, as they report positive, but 
statistically insignificant coefficients for initial GDP per capital levels, and statistically insignificant coefficients 
for investment and population growth. 
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regional characteristics (Table 2, Column 10), suggesting that the effect of geography cannot 
offset the impact of the local institutional environment on GDP per capita growth.   
The results for the individual components of the institutional composite index (Table 
2, Columns 5 to 8) are in line with the previously reported OLS findings. All parameter 
estimates for all coefficients remain positive and statistically highly significant. The 
magnitude of the coefficients is also slightly larger than in the OLS analysis, further 
reinforcing the crucial role of low levels of local corruption, government effectiveness, the 
rule of law, and government accountability for the local economic growth and 
competitiveness prospects in Europe’s NUTS-2 regions.  
Model specifications (9) to (12) in Table 2 examine and contrast the impact of sub-
national local institutions when controlling for the geography of places. When examining the 
effect of geography on economic per capita growth rates in isolation (Table 2, Column 9), all 
geographical components turn out to be statistically insignificant, indicating that, at least in 
the case of European regions for the period of analysis, ‘first-nature’ geography has no 
influence on economic performance. These results stand when government quality is 
introduced in the analysis (Table 2, Column 10). The coefficients for all physical 
geographical variables remain insignificant, with the only exception of latitude.  
Decomposing the results for the institutional composite index into its individual 
components and controlling for ‘first-nature’ geography (Table 2, Columns 11 to 13) further 
corroborates that institutions trump physical geography as a factor behind regional economic 
growth in Europe. Low levels of corruption emerge as a fundamental driver of economic 
growth (Table 2, Columns 11-13), while there is no sign of impact of any of the ‘first-nature’ 
geographical variables on regional growth.
22
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 These results, however, should be taken with a pinch of salt as multi-correlation concerns may be present in 
the results of Table 2, Columns 11-13.  
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Table 2: Standard Solow estimation including institutional parameters. Two stage least squares 
European Union 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Initial GDP per capita -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.005 -0.007** -0.009** -0.005 -0.006* -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 0.078 0.087 0.113 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.097) (0.102) (0.112) 
Investment (gross fixed capital formation) 
 
0.005* 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.014*** -0.051 -0.060 0.0001 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.066) (0.069) (0.031) 
Population growth 
  
-0.291** -0.305** -0.313** -0.349*** -0.329*** -0.358*** -0.289* -0.474*** -8.477 -8.424 -7.865 
   
(0.130) (0.126) (0.127) (0.128) (0.124) (0.128) (0.149) (0.153) (6.219) (6.301) (5.265) 
Institutional quality Index (QoG) 
   
0.063*** 
     
0.083*** 
   
    
(0.012) 
     
(0.015) 
   Fight against corruption 
    
0.071*** 
     
0.450** 0.435** 0.492** 
     
(0.012) 
     
(0.198) (0.197) (0.206) 
Rule of law 
     
0.044*** 
    
-0.825 -0.831 -0.734* 
      
(0.013) 
    
(0.519) (0.532) (0.416) 
Government effectiveness 
      
0.062*** 
   
0.614 0.638 0.483 
       
(0.011) 
   
(0.441) (0.459) (0.308) 
Government accountability 
       
0.043*** 
  
-0.024 -0.019 -0.105 
        
(0.014) 
  
(0.101) (0.101) (0.099) 
Coast 
        
-0.0002 0.0002 0.009 0.008 -0.006 
         
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Regional Ruggedness 
        
-0.0001 -0.00002 -0.001 0.000 0.005 
         
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Area 
        
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
         
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Latitude 
        
0.0001 -0.001** -0.048 -0.049 -0.043 
         
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.038) (0.039) (0.031) 
Latitude squared 
          
0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
           
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
            
0.001 -0.002 
            
(0.001) (0.002) 
Mean Temperature - January 
            
0.008 
             
(0.006) 
Constant 0.034 0.027 0.0141 -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.083** -0.116*** -0.069* 0.019 -0.146*** 0.379 0.248 0.018 
 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.038) (0.036) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.031) (0.045) (0.254) (0.239) (0.236) 
Observations 1840 1779 1595 1411 1411 1411 1410 1411 1595 1411 1410 1410 1410 
R-squared 0.664 0.642 0.636 0.665 0.667 0.664 0.661 0.666 0.636 0.666 0.602 0.652 0.176 
Anderson Rubin (Chi-statistic) 14.00 17.45 24.15 75.46 80.05 55.28 89.22 56.09 21.92 85.22 88.47 88.91 90.56 
Anderson Rubin (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Endogeneity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen-J 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.355 0.203 0.306 0.683 0.153 0.003 0.283 0.382 0.702 0.678 
Mean VIF 1.00 1.07 1.20 1.21 1.27 1.21 1.15 1.31 1.62 1.82 49.81 2624.62 2190.43 
Heterogeneity (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses below all coefficients. *, **, *** respectively denote the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels. Apart from the introduced historic variables, past values  were used as instruments. 
Constant and time dummies are not reported. It is worth noting that most VIFs apart from regression (11) to (13) are below 6. 
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4.3 IV-GMM estimations 
In order to further account for potential endogeneity concerns and to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, we conduct a third type of econometric estimations. In this case we resort to 
the use of a dynamic panel data approach, by means of a system-GMM estimation technique 
(Bond et al. 2001). The regression results of the Arellano-Bond system-GMM estimator are 
displayed in Table 3 and remain in line with the the findings of the OLS and 2-SLS 
regression approaches. The system-GMM regressions confirm the postive and highly 
significant role of low levels of corruption and of government accountability in promoting 
local economic performance (Table 3, Columns 5 and 8). The rule of law and government 
effectiveness have, by contrast, no significant impact on regional economic growth (Table 3, 
Columns 6 and 7). 
Some slight differences with respect to previous tables emerge when considering 
‘first-nature’ geographical variables. In particular, access to the sea appears to have a positive 
influence on economic performance (Table 3, Column 9), a fact which is confirmed when the 
quality of government index is introduced in the model (Table 3, Column 10). Most other 
coefficients for the different geographical factors considered remain insignificant at the usual 
threshold levels. The only exception is, once again, latitude, whose coefficient displays a 
weak statistical significance (Table 3, Column 9), although this significance is not robust to 
controlling for government quality (Table 3, Column 10).  
In Table 3, Columns 11 to 17 we contrast the relevance of a region’s physical 
geography with the sway on economic growth of individual insitutional factors. The results of 
this type of analysis further stress the relevance of institutional factors over economic growth. 
Low corruption, rule of law, and government accountability (Table 3, Columns 11, 12, 14, 15 
and 16) have a strong impact on European regional growth. Geography variables have, by 
contrast, and a much lower influence on regional economic performance. Only access to the 
coast and latitude display some sort of connection to growth, although the positive 
coefficients of a coastal location for growth do not survive the introduction of temperature 
variables and of the square of the latitude (Table 3, Columns 15 and 16). The IV-GMM 
analysis further confirms the positive influence of milder winter climates (January 
temperatures) on regional economic growth (Table 3, Columns 15 and 16). 
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Table 3: Standard Solow estimation including institutional parameters. IV-GMM: Arellano-Bond (two-step) 
European Union 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Initial GDP per capita -0.011 0.017 0.008 0.006 -0.007 0.015* 0.011 -0.001 0.013 0.006 
 
(0.021) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Investment (gross fixed capital formation) 
 
-0.003 -0.002 0.005 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.010*** -0.001 0.008** 
  
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Population growth 
  
0.016 -0.025 0.045 -0.162 -0.293 -0.217 -0.291 -0.239 
   
(0.241) (0.206) (0.201) (0.172) (0.198) (0.166) (0.264) (0.228) 
Institutional quality Index (QoG) 
   
0.004 
     
0.0213 
    
(0.014) 
     
(0.022) 
Fight against corruption 
    
0.068*** 
     
     
(0.015) 
     Rule of law 
     
0.019 
    
      
(0.013) 
    Government effectiveness 
      
-0.006 
   
       
(0.017) 
   Government accountability 
       
0.079*** 
  
        
(0.017) 
  Coast 
        
0.003* 0.004** 
         
(0.002) (0.002) 
Regional Ruggedness 
        
-0.00002 -0.001 
         
(0.001) (0.001) 
Latitude 
        
-0.0004* -0.0003 
         
(0.0002) (0.0003) 
Latitude-squared 
          
           Mean Temperature - July 
          
           Mean Temperature - January 
          
           
Observations 2576 2515 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 
Annual time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(5) 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 
AR(6) 0.639 0.401 0.215 0.167 0.150 0.150 0.144 0.094 0.207 0.148 
Hansen J 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.14 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Number of regions 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 
Number of instruments 51 88 120 154 154 154 154 154 123 156 
Notes:  Standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent and are reported in parentheses below all coefficients. *, **, *** respectively denote the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels.  
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Table 3 (continued): Standard Solow estimation including institutional parameters. IV-GMM: Arellano-Bond (two-step) 
European Union 
 
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Initial GDP per capita 0.001 0.013 0.016** 0.002 0.007 0.019 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) 
Investment (gross fixed capital formation) 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.008** 0.017** 0.016** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) 
Population growth -0.415** -0.426** -0.630*** -0.559*** -1.118*** -1.204*** 
 
(0.201) (0.201) (0.235) (0.195) (0.349) (0.359) 
Institutional quality Index (QoG) 
      
       Fight against corruption 0.131*** 
   
0.152*** 
 
 
(0.022) 
   
(0.027) 
 Rule of law 
 
0.053*** 
    
  
(0.018) 
    Government effectiveness 
  
0.017 
   
   
(0.022) 
   Government accountability 
   
0.121*** 
 
0.099*** 
    
(0.025) 
 
(0.031) 
Coast 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005** 0.006*** -0.004 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Regional Ruggedness -0.0004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Latitude -0.001*** -0.001** -0.0004 -0.001*** -0.019** -0.006 
 
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.008) (0.008) 
Latitude-squared 
    
0.0002** 0.0001 
     
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
Mean Temperature - July 
    
-0.002 -0.001 
     
(0.001) (0.001) 
Mean Temperature - January 
    
0.003*** 0.003*** 
     
(0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 
Annual time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(5) 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.004 
AR(6) 0.156 0.128 0.140 0.080 0.119 0.058 
Hansen J 0.20 0.17 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.99 
Number of regions 184 184 184 184 184 184 
Number of instruments 157 157 157 158 158 158 
Notes:  Standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent and reported in parentheses below all coefficients. *, **, *** 
respectively denote the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels.  
 
 
25 
4.4 Spatially augmented growth model 
 
In Table 4 we estimate the spatially augmented Solow model using OLS, 2SLS and IV-GMM 
methods. First, previous results are largely confirmed when introducing spatial dependency. 
A region's own past GDP per capita levels is negatively connected, in the OLS and IV-GMM 
findings, with current economic growth rates, pointing to a catching-up of the poorer regions 
in Europe over the considered time horizon. Regional physical capital has a positive and 
statistically highly significant impact on local economic growth for the OLS and IV-GMM 
estimations. Regional population growth rates shows negative coefficients in all 
specifications, but are not always statistically significant. The institutional quality variable 
displays positive and statistically significant coefficients when using OLS or IV-GMM, even 
when adding geographical variables, underlining once more the importance of government 
quality for economic growth.  
Second and turning to the effect of cross-border spill-overs, neighbouring GDP per 
capita levels appear to be detrimental to local economic growth rates. This may point, under 
certain conditions, to higher growth in regions that are surrounded by poorer areas, and an 
associated catching up process. In addition, the coefficients for regional investment in 
neighbouring areas show negative signs, which are however only significant when using OLS 
or IV-GMM, suggesting lower growth in regions surrounded by important investments in 
physical capital. Neighbouring population growth rates show in most specifications positive 
coefficients, which are however not statistically significant at the usual thresholds.
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Economic growth in surrounding areas, by contrast, positively and significantly affects 
economic growth, highlighting the presence of important growth spillovers. Finally, 
government quality in neighbouring regions is in most specifications statistically insignificant 
at the usual levels, apart from the OLS and IV-GMM specifications that include geographical 
variables where the spatially lagged government quality variable shows a negative sign.  
 
 
                                                     
23
 The 2SLS results display negative coefficients. However and given the rather high values for the VIF tests 
and rather low levels for the Hansen J tests, these results need to be interpreted with some caution. 
26 
 
Table 4: Spatially augmented Solow estimation: Institutional parameters and NUTS-2 regional economic growth in NUTS-2 regions.  
European Union 
  OLS 2SLS IV GMM 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Initial GDP per capita -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 0.015* 0.021 0.026* -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 
 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Investment 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.017*** -0.004 -0.006 -0.001 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Population growth -0.666** -0.374 -0.351 -5.455* -5.409 -4.343 -0.666** -0.374 -0.351 
 
(0.321) (0.274) (0.254) (3.304) (3.751) (4.518) (0.321) (0.274) (0.254) 
Institutional quality index (QoG) - 0.028*** 0.050*** - -0.016 -0.008 - 0.028*** 0.050*** 
 
- (0.008) (0.013) - (0.032) (0.041) - (0.008) (0.013) 
Spatially weighed initial GDP per 
capita 
-0.009*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.012 -0.015 -0.020* -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Spatially weighed investment -0.034** -0.034*** -0.030*** -0.016 -0.025 -0.047 -0.034** -0.034*** -0.030*** 
 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.065) (0.068) (0.060) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) 
Spatially weighed  population growth 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.031 0.030 0.023 0.003 0.002 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.019) (0.022) (0.027) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Spatially weighed  economic growth 1.279*** 1.482*** 1.490*** 4.628*** 5.137*** 5.101*** 1.279*** 1.482*** 1.490*** 
 
(0.189) (0.193) (0.192) (0.647) (1.189) (1.268) (0.189) (0.193) (0.192) 
Spatially weighed institutional quality 
index 
- -0.002 -0.003** - -0.001 -0.005 - -0.002 -0.003** 
 
- (0.001) (0.001) - (0.013) (0.015) - (0.001) (0.001) 
Coast - - 0.003*** - - -0.002 - - 0.003*** 
 
- - (0.001) - - (0.003) - - (0.001) 
Regional Ruggedness - - 0.001 - - -0.001 - - 0.001 
 
- - (0.0004) - - (0.001) - - (0.0004) 
Area - - -0.0003 - - -0.0003 - - -0.0003 
 
- - (0.0002) - - (0.0004) - - (0.0002) 
Observations 2318 2318 2318 1403 1403 1403 2318 2318 2318 
R-squared 0.860 0.862 0.863 0.830 0.121 0.169 - - - 
Mean VIF 5.43 5.08 4.85 144.53 136.15 149.25 - - - 
Endogeneity - - - 0.000 0.000 0.000 - - - 
AR(5) - - - - - - 0.002 0.001 0.001 
AR(6) - - - - - - 0.181 0.195 0.220 
Hansen J - - - 0.830 0.749 0.556 0.725 1.000 1.000 
Heterogeneity (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes:  Standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent and are reported in parentheses below all coefficients. *, **, *** respectively denote the 10%, 5%, 
1% significance levels. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have revisited the geography vs. institutions controversy by analysing 
whether it is ‘first-nature’ geography or institutions which has had a greater influence over 
regional growth in 184 regions of the 15 original member states of the European Union. The 
paper provides several novelties. It is the first paper which has tackled this controversy 
directly at subnational level. Previous analyses focused on the national scale, where contrasts 
in geographical dimensions and institutional conditions are far greater than at the European 
level. It is also one of a handful of papers which has delved in detail and using advanced 
econometric techniques on the role of institutions and/or physical geography for economic 
growth across regions in Europe. The analysis has also been concerned with economic 
growth, rather than with levels of economic development as was the case of past studies 
(Tabellini 2010; Gennaioli et al. 2013). 
On the whole, the results of the analysis underline the importance of local institutional 
conditions for economic development in Europe. Regional government quality emerges as a 
fundamental driver of economic performance across the EU. In particular, low corruption and 
government accountability are crucial factors behind regional economic growth in Europe. 
These findings are robust to changes in the model specification and to the use of different 
estimation techniques (OLS, 2-SLS, IV-GMM, and spatial models), while the IV analyses 
demonstrate that the causality runs from institutions to economic performance and not vice 
versa. The results also underline that, in contrast to past studies which have stressed that 
“institutions may be important at the national, but not at the regional level” (Gennaioli et al. 
2013: 137), regional institutions, proxied by government quality are fundamental elements in 
the European growth equation. This result vindicates the work of social scientists who have 
for decades stressed the importance of the quality of local institutions for economic 
development across different parts of Europe (e.g. Banfield 1958; Trigilia 1992; Putnam 
1993), as well as that of more recent cross-regional research focusing on culture and 
institutions (e.g. Tabellini 2010; Rodríguez-Pose and di Cataldo 2015).  
‘First-nature’ geography exerts a much weaker influence on regional economic 
growth. While latitude, milder winters and, in some cases, access to the sea are relevant in 
determining the development potential of regions in Europe, all the other geographical factors 
considered are irrelevant for growth. This absence of physical geographical determinism in a 
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continent where geographical extremes are to a large extent absent, implies that institutions 
and government quality are much better predictors of regional economic performance. 
Overall, the results highlight that at a regional level in Europe institutions rule over 
‘first-nature’ geography. Tackling issues such as corruption or government accountability is 
therefore essential in order to address existing development bottlenecks. This gives regional 
policy a power to change economic development in Europe, which would have not existed 
had physical geographical conditions trumped the influence of institutional quality over 
economic growth. Hence, regional development policies can make a significant difference to 
address economic growth problems in Europe, provided they take how institutions shape 
economic performance seriously. 
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Annex 
 
Table A1: description of variables 
Variable Exact definition Source 
 
    
GDP per capita Total regional GDP PPS per inhabitant   Eurostat  
Gross fixed capital formation (in 
% of GDP) 
Gross fixed capital formation consists of resident producers´ 
acquisitions, less disposals, of fixed tangible or intangible assets 
Eurostat  
Population growth rate Annual growth rate of the total regional population Eurostat  
Government quality index 
Regional quality of government index constructed combining the 
following four indicators 
Charron et al. (2014) 
Corruption index 
Measure of corruption in the public school and health care system, 
and other public services 
Charron et al. (2014) 
Rule of law  index 
Index measuring the residents’ perception of the objectivity and 
confidence in the police and in regional law enforcement. 
Charron et al. (2014) 
Efficiency  index 
Index evaluating the quality of the civil service, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, as well as the government's 
credibility. 
Charron et al. (2014) 
Voice & accountability  index 
Extent of citizens’ participation in participating in election and the 
political, as well as freedom of expression, and of the media. 
Charron et al. (2014) 
Romanization 
Dummy variable indicating whether a region belonged to the Roman 
empire at the time of Caesar (49 BC). 
Mion, Duranton, Rodriguez-
Pose 
Charlemagne’s Empire 
Indicator variable taking the value 1 if a region was part of the 
Charlemagne empire and/ or represented a tributary territory to the 
latter at the time of the emperor’s death 
Mion, Duranton, Rodriguez-
Pose 
Early Christianization 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if a region was Christianized by 
around 600 AD. 
Mion, Duranton, Rodriguez-
Pose 
Number of Kingdom Changes 
Variable thus measures the number of time a NUTS-2 region has 
experienced a different ruler (i.e. kingdom) 
Mion, Duranton, Rodriguez-
Pose 
Latitude   Latitude of the centroid of a region Eurostat 
Coast Equals 1 if a region borders the sea ESPON project 2.1.1 
Terrain Ruggedness 
Log of 1 plus the variable slope. The slope variable has been 
measured as the difference between the max and min of altitude in 
meters 
Mion, Duranton, Rodriguez-
Pose 
Area Surface in square kms Eurostat 
Temperature mean - July 
Mean temperature in July of each year between 1971 and 2000,  in 
°Celsius 
Mitchell et al (2004) 
Temperature mean - Jan 
Mean temperature in January of each year between 1971 and 2000,  
in °Celsius. 
Mitchell et al (2004) 
Precipitation mean - Jan Mean January precipitation (in mm) 1971-2000 Mitchell et al (2004) 
Precipitation mean - Jul Mean July precipitation (in mm) 1971-2000 Mitchell et al (2004) 
Cloudiness mean - Jan 
Mean cloudiness in January measure on an annual basis between 
1971 and 2000; in % of time. 
Mitchell et al (2004) 
Cloudiness mean - Jul Mean July cloudiness (in \% time) 1971-2000 Mitchell et al (2004) 
Mean January diurnal 
temperature range - Jan 
Mean January diurnal temper. range (in °C) 1971-2000 Mitchell et al (2004) 
Mean July diurnal temperature 
range - July 
Mean July diurnal temper. range (in °C) 1971-2000 Mitchell et al (2004) 
Mean January potent 
evapotranspiration - Jan 
Mean January potent evapotranspiration (in hPa) 1971-2000 Mitchell et al (2004) 
Mean January potent 
evapotranspiration - July 
Mean July potent evapotranspiration (in hPa) 1971-2000 Mitchell et al (2004) 
Soil limits to agriculture Soil limits to agriculture. 1=no limits, 2=gravelly, 3=stony, etc.
(1)
 European Soil Database 
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(ESDB) 
Subsoil water capacity Subsoil water capacity. 1=very low, 2=low, etc.
(1)
 
European Soil Database 
(ESDB) 
 Topsoil water capacity Topsoil water capacity. 1=very low, 2=low, etc.
(1)
 
European Soil Database 
(ESDB) 
Soil erosion Soil erosion. 1=very weak, 2=weak, etc.
(1)
 
European Soil Database 
(ESDB) 
Subsoil mineralogy Subsoil mineralogy. 1=KQ, 2=KX 
(2)
 
European Soil Database 
(ESDB) 
Topsoil mineralogy Topsoil mineralogy. 1=KQ, 2=KX 
(2)
 
European Soil Database 
(ESDB) 
Soil organic content Soil organic content. 1=high, 2=medium, etc.
(1)
 
European Soil Database 
(ESDB) 
Dominant parent material Dominant parent material. 1=consol.-clastic-sediment. rocks, etc.
(1)
 
European Soil Database 
(ESDB) 
Class of soil Class of soil. 1=podzol, 2=cambisol, 3=ferralsol, etc.
(1)
 
European Soil Database 
(ESDB) 
Soil differentiation Soil differentiation. 0=differentiation, 1=low, etc. 
(1)
 
European Soil Database 
(ESDB) 
Soil depth Soil depth. 0=shallow, 1=moderate, etc.
(1)
 
European Soil Database 
(ESDB) 
Notes: The dataset spans the time period 1995 to 2009 and includes 254 EU regions. (1) The complete list is available upon request. (2)KQ 
stands for minerals and quartz, while KX denotes minerals and oxides and hydroxides.  
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Table A2: Summary statistics         
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     GDP per capita
(i)
 22332.92 7315.63 8600.00 81400.00 
Gross fixed capital formation (in % of GDP).
 (i)
 0.19 0.07 -0.10 0.53 
Population growth rate 
(i) (ii)
 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.09 
Government quality index
(i) (iii)
 10.66 0.64 7.44 11.62 
Corruption index
(i) (iii)
 10.64 0.68 7.33 11.80 
Rule of law  index
(i) (iii)
 10.64 0.62 7.62 13.36 
Efficiency  index
(i) (iii)
 10.68 0.79 7.27 12.02 
Accountability  index
(i) (iii)
 10.56 0.62 2.99 13.11 
Romanization 0 0 0 1 
Charlemagne’s Empire 1 0 0 1 
Early Christianization 1 0 0 1 
Number of Kingdom Changes 1 1 0 4 
Latitude   49.44 5.50 37.24 66.40 
Latitude (squared) 2474.54 548.84 1386.89 4408.50 
Coast 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Terrain Ruggedness 5.38 1.66 0.00 7.82 
Area 15792.08 20992.45 161.40 154311.90 
Temperature mean - July 18.03 2.59 10.79 25.22 
Temperature mean - Jan 2.29 3.77 -12.90 11.21 
Precipitation mean - Jan 69.25 28.29 29.70 216.59 
Precipitation mean - Jul 63.77 29.24 4.62 181.01 
Cloudiness mean - Jan 77.02 9.34 50.48 88.71 
Cloudiness mean - Jul 58.44 13.73 22.18 79.45 
Mean January diurnal temperature range - Jan 5.78 1.19 3.95 9.94 
Mean July diurnal temperature range - July 10.01 1.56 6.69 16.21 
Mean January potent evapotranspiration - Jan 10.99 7.19 0.00 34.58 
Mean January potent evapotranspiration - July 105.04 21.53 74.47 160.81 
Soil limits to agriculture 2.41 2.55 0 12 
Subsoil water capacity 3.65 1.11 1 6 
Topsoil water capacity 2.74 0.65 1 4 
Soil erosion 3.54 0.63 2 5 
Subsoil mineralogy 2.27 0.56 1 4 
Topsoil mineralogy 2.43 0.76 1 6 
Soil organic content 2.92 0.61 2 4 
Dominant parent material 4.06 1.68 0 7 
Class of soil 2.24 2.20 1 9 
Soil differentiation 1.00 0.50 0 2 
Soil depth 1.09 0.89 0 3 
Notes: (i): The variables marked with (i) were introduced in the regression analysis taking the natural 
logarithms. (ii): Following Mankiw et al. (1995) the population growth rate has been modified by 
adding a value of 0.05 to take into account technological progress and capital depreciation. (iii): The 
regional institutional parameters are measured against the national mean values. A value of 10 
indicates no deviation from the national mean.  
36 
Table A3: Standard Solow-Swan-type growth framework. NUTS-2 regional economic growth, 1995-2009 – geographical attributes. Pooled OLS 
    European Union 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Initial GDP per capita -0.006* -0.006* -0.005 -0.004 -0.006* -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.0002 
 (0.003 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Investment (gross fixed capital formation) 
 
-0.0002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003* 0.002 0.0009 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.005** 0.005** 
 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Population growth 
  
-0.058 -0.077 -0.067 -0.049 -0.122 -0.159 -0.072 -0.146 -0.158 -0.085 -0.125 -0.320** -0.314** 
 
  
(0.085) (0.091) (0.080) (0.087) (0.104) (0.103) (0.091) (0.104) (0.109) (0.099) (0.100) (0.131) (0.126) 
Coast 
   
0.002 
        
-0.0004 
 
-0.0002 
    
(0.001) 
        
(0.001) 
 
(0.002) 
Regional Ruggedness 
    
-0.0004 
       
-0.001* 
 
-0.0003 
     
(0.0004) 
       
(0.001 
 
(0.001) 
Area 
     
0.000 
      
0.000 
 
0.000 
      
(0.000) 
      
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
   Temperature (mean) - July 
      
-0.0002 
      
0.002 0.0003 
       
(0.0004) 
      
(0.002) (0.002) 
   Temperature (mean) - January 
      
0.0003 
      
0.001 0.001 
       
(0.0003) 
      
(0.001) (0.001) 
   Precipitation (mean) - July 
       
0.00002 
     
-0.00001 -0.00001 
        
(0.00003) 
     
(0.00004) (0.00004) 
   Precipitation (mean) - January 
       
-0.0001*** 
     
-0.00002 0.00001 
        
(0.00002) 
     
(0.00004) (0.0001) 
   Cloudiness (mean) - July 
        
-0.0001 
    
0.0001 0.0001 
         
(0.0001) 
    
(0.0002) (0.0003) 
   Cloudiness (mean) - January 
        
0.00004 
    
-0.001 -0.001 
         
(0.0001) 
    
(0.001) (0.001) 
   Diurnal temperature range (mean) - January 
         
0.002*** 
   
0.002* 0.002 
 
         
(0.001) 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
  Diurnal temperature range (mean) - July 
         
0.0003 
   
0.001 0.002* 
          
(0.001) 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
   Evapotranspiration (mean) - January 
          
0.001** 
  
0.0004 0.0002 
           
(0.0003) 
  
(0.0004) (0.001) 
   Evapotranspiration (mean) - July 
          
-0.0002* 
  
-0.001* -0.001 
           
(0.0001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Latitude 
           
-0.004*** -0.006** 
 
-0.005 
            
(0.001) (0.002) 
 
(0.008) 
Latitude (squared) 
           
0.00004*** 0.0001** 
 
0.0001 
            
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.0001) 
Constant -0.006 -0.011 -0.013 -0.019 -0.004 -0.020 -0.021 -0.043 -0.007 -0.041 -0.019 0.065 0.118* 0.094 0.130 
 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.036) (0.037) (0.040) (0.061) (0.108) (0.297) 
Observations 2576 2515 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 
R-squared 0.628 0.600 0.609 0.609 0.609 0.609 0.609 0.611 0.609 0.611 0.610 0.611 0.612 0.616 0.617 
Heterogeneity (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses below all coefficients. *, **, *** respectively denote the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Time dummies are not reported. 
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Table A4: Standard Solow-Swan-type growth framework. NUTS-2 regional economic growth, 1995-2009 – geographical attributes controlling for institutions. Pooled OLS 
European Union   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Initial GDP per capita -0.006* -0.006* -0.005 -0.007* -0.006 -0.007* -0.006* -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 0.0001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Investment (gross fixed capital formation) 
 
-0.0001 0.002 0.003 0.003* 0.003* 0.002 0.003 0.005** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.001 0.004* 0.004* 
 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Population growth 
  
-0.058 -0.030 -0.053 -0.037 -0.023 -0.144 -0.172* -0.064 -0.129 -0.182* -0.122 -0.172* -0.316** -0.304** 
 
  
(0.085) (0.080) (0.085) (0.081) (0.081) (0.097) (0.093) (0.087) (0.100) (0.108) (0.100) (0.101) (0.130) (0.121) 
Quality of government index 
   
0.025*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.048*** 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.034*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 
   
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) 
Coast 
    
0.002 
        
0.0002 
 
-0.001 
 
    
(0.001) 
        
(0.001) 
 
(0.002) 
Regional Ruggedness 
     
-0.0002 
       
-0.001* 
 
-0.0004 
 
     
(0.0004) 
       
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
Area 
      
0.000 
      
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
      
(0.000) 
      
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
   Temperature (mean) - July 
       
0.001 
      
0.001 -0.001 
 
       
(0.0004) 
      
(0.002) (0.002) 
   Temperature (mean) - January 
       
0.0004 
      
0.001 0.001 
 
       
(0.0003) 
      
(0.001) (0.001) 
   Precipitation (mean) - July 
        
0.00003 
     
0.00001 0.000 
 
        
(0.00002) 
     
(0.00003) (0.00004 
   Precipitation (mean) - January 
        
-0.0001*** 
     
-0.0001 -0.00001 
 
        
(0.00002) 
     
(0.00004) (0.00004 
   Cloudiness (mean) - July 
         
-0.0001 
    
0.0001 -0.00003 
 
         
(0.0001) 
    
(0.0002) (0.0003 
   Cloudiness (mean) - January 
         
-0.0001 
    
-0.001 0.0001 
 
         
(0.0001) 
    
(0.001) (0.001) 
   Diurnal temperature range (mean) - Jan 
          
0.002*** 
   
0.002** 0.002* 
           
(0.001) 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
  Diurnal temperature range (mean) - July 
          
0.0003 
   
0.0003 0.0004 
 
          
(0.001) 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
   Evapotranspiration (mean) - January 
           
0.001** 
  
0.0003 -0.001 
 
           
(0.0002) 
  
(0.0004) (0.001) 
   Evapotranspiration (mean) - July 
           
-0.0001 
  
-0.001 0.0001 
 
           
(0.0001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Latitude 
            
-0.006*** -0.007*** 
 
-0.010 
 
            
(0.0013) (0.0023) 
 
(0.008) 
Latitude (squared) 
            
0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 
0.0001 
 
            
(0.00001) (0.00002) 
 
(0.0001) 
Constant -0.006 -0.011 -0.013 -0.056* -0.066* -0.049 -0.062* -0.136*** -0.131*** -0.093** -0.106*** -0.147*** 0.001 0.051 -0.102 0.103 
 
(0.034 (0.034 (0.035 (0.033 (0.034 (0.032 (0.033 (0.044 (0.038 (0.045 (0.035 (0.048 (0.036 (0.058 (0.114) (0.284) 
Observations 2576 2515 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 
R-squared 0.628 0.600 0.609 0.610 0.611 0.610 0.611 0.613 0.614 0.612 0.614 0.614 0.615 0.616 0.618 0.619 
Heterogeneity (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses below all coefficients. *, **, *** respectively denote the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Time dummies are not reported. 
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Table A5: Standard Solow-Swan-type growth framework. NUTS-2 regional economic growth, 1995-2009 – soil characteristics. Pooled OLS 
   European Union 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (14) (15) (16) 
Initial GDP per capita -0.006* -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006* -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006* -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008** -0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Investment (gross fixed capital formation) 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.00003 0.002 
 (0.002 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Population growth -0.075 -0.059 -0.049 -0.062 -0.042 -0.047 -0.068 -0.061 -0.053 -0.059 -0.061 -0.048 -0.086 -0.044 
 (0.080 (0.087) (0.086) (0.086) (0.084) (0.084) (0.088) (0.088) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.087) (0.084) 
Soil limits to agriculture 0.001*** 
           
0.001*** 
 
 
(0.0002) 
           
(0.0002) 
 Subsoil water capacity 
 
0.0001 
          
0.002** 
 
  
(0.001) 
          
(0.001) 
 Topsoil water capacity 
  
-0.002** 
         
-0.002* 
 
   
(0.001) 
         
(0.001) 
 Soil erosion 
   
-0.0004 
        
0.00002 
 
    
(0.001) 
        
(0.001) 
 Subsoil mineralogy 
    
-0.002 
       
0.0004 0.00004 
     
(0.001) 
       
(0.001) (0.001) 
Topsoil mineralogy 
     
-0.001 
      
-0.001 -0.0003 
      
(0.001) 
      
(0.001) (0.001) 
Soil organic content 
      
-0.001 
     
-0.001 -0.0002 
       
(0.001) 
     
(0.001) (0.001) 
Dominant parent material 
       
-0.0001 
    
-0.00001 0.0004 
        
(0.0004) 
    
(0.001) (0.0004) 
Class of soil 
        
0.001*** 
   
0.001*** 0.001*** 
         
(0.0003) 
   
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
Soil differentiation 
         
-0.0003 
  
0.0004 -0.001 
          
(0.0011) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Soil depth 
          
0.001 
 
0.001 0.001* 
           
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Temperature zone 
           
-0.002 
  
 
           
(0.002) 
  Constant -0.006 -0.013 -0.002 -0.012 -0.003 -0.009 -0.008 -0.012 -0.005 -0.012 -0.011 -0.0124 0.009 0.007 
 
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.035) 
Observations 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 
R-squared 0.611 0.609 0.610 0.609 0.609 0.609 0.609 0.609 0.612 0.609 0.609 0.609 0.616 0.613 
Heterogeneity (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses below all coefficients. *, **, *** respectively denote the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Time dummies are not reported. 
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Table A6: Standard Solow-Swan-type growth framework. NUTS-2 regional economic growth, 1995-2009 – soil characteristics controlling for institutions. Pooled OLS 
   European Union 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (14) (15) (16) 
Initial GDP per capita -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007** -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007** -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.009** -0.009** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Investment (gross fixed capital formation) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.0004 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Population growth -0.050 -0.038 -0.027 -0.037 -0.021 -0.025 -0.041 -0.047 -0.031 -0.033 -0.033 -0.029 -0.086 -0.041 
 (0.078) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.079) (0.079) (0.082) (0.083) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.080) (0.084) (0.079) 
Quality of government index 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Soil limits to agriculture 0.001*** 
           
0.001*** 
 
 
(0.0002) 
           
(0.0002) 
 Subsoil water capacity 
 
0.001 
          
0.002** 
 
  
(0.001) 
          
(0.001) 
 Topsoil water capacity 
  
-0.002* 
         
-0.002** 
 
   
(0.001) 
         
(0.001) 
 Soil erosion 
   
-0.001 
        
0.00003 
 
    
(0.001) 
        
(0.001) 
 Subsoil mineralogy 
    
-0.001 
       
0.001 0.0003 
     
(0.001) 
       
(0.001) (0.001) 
Topsoil mineralogy 
     
-0.0003 
      
-0.001 -0.0002 
      
(0.001) 
      
(0.001) (0.001) 
Soil organic content 
      
-0.001 
     
-0.001 -0.0004 
       
(0.001) 
     
(0.001) (0.001) 
Dominant parent material 
       
-0.0004 
    
-0.0002 0.0001 
        
(0.0004) 
    
(0.001) (0.0004) 
Class of soil 
        
0.001*** 
   
0.001*** 0.001*** 
         
(0.0003) 
   
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
Soil differentiation 
         
-0.0004 
  
0.001 -0.001 
          
(0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Soil depth 
          
0.001 
 
0.001 0.002** 
           
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Temperature zone 
           
-0.0004 
   
           
(0.002) 
  Constant -0.0432 -0.063* -0.042 -0.057* -0.047 -0.053 -0.051 -0.059* -0.041 -0.054* -0.058* -0.055 -0.035 -0.036 
 
(0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.032) 
Observations 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 
R-squared 0.612 0.610 0.611 0.610 0.610 0.610 0.610 0.611 0.613 0.610 0.611 0.610 0.617 0.614 
Heterogeneity (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses below all coefficients. *, **, *** respectively denote the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Time dummies are not reported. 
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Table A7:  Regional institutional parameters and economic growth in European NUTS-2 regions. 
First stage 
  Government 
quality 
Corruption Rule of law 
Government 
effectiveness 
Government 
accountability 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Past GDP per capita -0.004* 0.005** -0.005* -0.002 0.010 
 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 
Past Investment -0.004*** 0.009*** -0.006*** -0.011*** 0.001 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 
Past population growth -0.014 0.036 0.119 -0.213 0.077 
 
-0.087 -0.084 -0.094 -0.163 -0.141 
Past values - Institutional quality 
index 
1.124*** 
    
 
-0.009 
    
Roman Empire -0.003** -0.001 -0.014*** -0.002 -0.029*** 
 
-0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 
Charlemagne's empire 0.004*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.003 0.013*** 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
Early Christianity -0.001 0.001 -0.009*** 0.005*** -0.016*** 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 
Changes in kingdom affiliation -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
Past corruption 
 
1.042*** 
   
  
-0.016 
   
Past rule of law levels 
  
1.119*** 
  
   
-0.045 
  
Past government effectiveness 
   
1.078*** 
 
    
-0.014 
 
Past government accountability 
    
0.582*** 
     
-0.164 
Constant -0.279*** -0.159*** -0.252** -0.194*** 0.908*** 
 
-0.027 -0.037 -0.101 -0.045 -0.332 
Observations 1411 1411 1411 1410 1411 
F-statistic of joint significance 2937.88 1622.08 782.86 1222.91 201.03 
F-statistic (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AP Chi-sq. (p-value) 3818.79 8810.71 3910.63 8438.86 1120.33 
AP F-statistic 3818.79 1742.16 773.26 1668.62 221.52 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses below all coefficients. *, **, *** respectively denote the 10%, 5%, 1% 
significance levels. The first-stage regression results displayed above only report the first-stage regressions for the 
specifications (4) to (8) presented in table 2. 
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Table A8: Institutional parameters and NUTS-2 regional 
economic growth. FE estimations. 
European Union 
  (1) (2) 
Initial GDP per capita -0.193*** -0.212*** 
 
(0.015) (0.015) 
Investment (gross fixed capital 
formation) 
-0.006** -0.006** 
 
-(0.003 (0.003) 
Population growth -0.907*** -0.825*** 
 
(0.156) (0.155) 
Institutional quality Index (QoG) 0.185*** 
 
 
(0.048) 
 
Fight against corruption 
 
0.339*** 
 
 
(0.072) 
Rule of law 
 
-0.027 
 
 
(0.050) 
Government effectiveness 
 
0.259*** 
 
 
(0.024) 
Government accountability 
 
-0.0002 
 
 
(0.036) 
Coast dropped dropped 
 
  
Regional Ruggedness dropped dropped 
 
  
Area dropped dropped 
 
  
Latitude dropped dropped 
 
  
Latitude squared 
 
dropped 
 
  
Mean Temperature - July 
 
dropped 
 
  
Mean Temperature - January 
 
dropped 
 
  
Constant 2.432*** 2.065*** 
 
(0.131) (0.156) 
Observations 2331 2331 
R-squared 0.679 0.694 
Number of NUTS-2 regions 184 184 
Heterogeneity (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
Notes:  Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent and are 
reported in parentheses below all coefficients. *, **, *** respectively 
denote the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels. The t-statistics are 
shown in parentheses. Constant and time dummies are not reported. 
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Table A9: Interaction terms: Institutional parameters and the geography of places  
European Union 
  OLS 2SLS IV GMM 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Initial GDP per capita -0.026*** -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.026*** -0.033*** -0.030*** 0.008 0.002 0.006 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Investment 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.007** 0.009** 0.003 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Population growth -0.678** -0.473 -0.412 -0.678** -0.473 -0.412 -0.062 -0.158 -0.185 
 
(0.337) (0.289) (0.300) (0.337) (0.289) (0.300) (0.239) (0.214) (0.249) 
Institutional quality index 
(QoG) 
-0.145 -0.514* 0.563* -0.145 -0.514* 0.563* 0.096 0.406*** -0.556*** 
 
(0.104) (0.292) (0.292) (0.104) (0.292) (0.292) (0.065) (0.128) (0.207) 
Institutional quality index * 
Coast 
0.281** 
  
0.281** 
  
-0.110 
  
 
(0.129) 
  
(0.129) 
  
(0.075) 
  
Institutional quality index * 
Ruggedness  
0.095** 
  
0.095** 
  
-0.062*** 
 
  
(0.047) 
  
(0.047) 
  
(0.018) 
 
Institutional quality index * 
Latitude   
-0.011 
  
-0.011 
  
0.014*** 
   
(0.007) 
  
(0.007) 
  
(0.005) 
Coast -0.661** 
  
-0.661** 
  
0.264 
  
 
(0.301) 
  
(0.301) 
  
(0.178) 
  
Regional Ruggedness 
 
-0.226** 
  
-0.226** 
  
0.147*** 
 
  
(0.111) 
  
(0.111) 
  
(0.044) 
 
Latitude 
  
0.027 
  
0.027 
  
-0.033*** 
   
(0.017) 
  
(0.017) 
  
(0.012) 
Observations 1411 1411 1411 1411 1411 1411 2331 2331 2331 
R-squared 0.089 0.089 0.084 0.181 0.183 0.166 --- --- --- 
Mean VIF 652.35 425.85 626.80 2032.46 1030.68 1220.58 --- --- --- 
Endogeneity --- --- --- 0.0003 0.0006 0.0003 0.000 --- --- 
AR(5) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.005 0.005 0.005 
AR(6) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.178 0.170 0.117 
Hansen J --- --- --- 0.4426 0.6222 0.5809 0.10 0.09 0.09 
Heterogeneity (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes:  Standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent and are reported in parentheses below all coefficients. *, **, *** respectively denote the 10%, 5%, 
1% significance levels. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  
 
 
 
